

THE CAADP 2020 BIENNIAL REVIEW: WHY MANY COUNTRIES ARE OFF-TRACK

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INTRODUCTION

African leaders have remained committed to mutual accountability for actions and results in efforts to transform Africa's agriculture sector. Since the leaders signed the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Africa Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods (AU 2014) in 2014, the African Union (AU) has released two biennial review (BR) reports and the Africa Agricultural Transformation Scorecard (AATS) that track progress in implementing the Declaration. The inaugural BR report, released at the AU Summit in January 2018, showed that 20 of the 47 reporting countries were on-track to achieve the goals and targets of the Malabo Declaration by 2025, though the continent overall was not-on-track (AUC 2018). The second BR report, released at the AU Summit in February 2020, shows that only 4 countries (Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and Rwanda) of the 49 reporting countries are on-track, as the continent overall continued to be not-on-track (AUC 2020). This indicates a slowdown of progress in implementing the Declaration.

The classification of “on-track” or “not-on-track” used in the BR and AATS is based on an overall score on a scale of 0 to 10 that is given for the aggregated progress made in a set of indicators against a specified benchmark or milestone for the review period (there were 43 indicators tracked in the 2018 BR and 47 in the 2020 BR). Countries with a score at or above the benchmark are classified as being on-track, whereas those below are classified as being not-on-track. Because it was expected that countries would increase their performance in the indicator scores gradually from the baseline year of 2015 to the target end year of 2025, the benchmarks for the sequential review periods have been crafted to increase over time, set, for example, at 3.94 in the 2018 BR and 6.66 in the 2020 BR. Therefore, the huge reduction in the number of countries classified as being on-track in the 2020 BR compared to the 2018 BR seems puzzling, and may erroneously be attributed of the higher benchmark set for the 2020 BR.

This note analyzes the trajectory of the benchmark and its implications for the effort required of countries to remain on-track or get on-track toward achieving the goals and targets of the Malabo Declaration by 2025. It also analyzes the change in the overall score obtained by different countries between the 2018 and 2020 BRs by decomposing the contribution of different indicators to the change. This helps to explain why fewer countries were on-track in the 2020 BR compared to the 2018 BR. The note concludes with a look at the potential challenges countries may face, most notably those brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, and prospects for them to remain or get on-track in future BRs.

THE BR AND AATS BENCHMARKS


The BR and AATS benchmarks are based on annual milestones to be achieved between 2015 (the baseline) and 2025 (the endline) for the different indicators. Most of these milestones are calculated using a linear trend on a scale of 0 for 2015 and 10 for 2025. Then, the milestones are aggregated across the different indicators to obtain annual benchmarks reported on in the BR or AATS. Because different indicators have different target years and different weights in the overall score for achieving the Malabo Declaration, the

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trajectory of the annual benchmarks is nonlinear. For example, the target for the indicators on public and private investment (2.1i to 2.1iii) and agricultural growth (4.1i) must be achieved each year and so they have a milestone value of 10 for each year from 2015 to 2025. For the indicators on CAADP process (1.1 to 1.3), the target was to complete the process by 2018, so they have milestone values of 0 for 2015, 3.33 for 2016, 6.67 for 2017, and then 10 each year from 2018 to 2025. Similarly, the target for some indicators is 2023, so these milestones increase uniformly to reach 10 in 2023 and remain at 10 through 2025. For the remaining indicators, the target is 2025, and so they have milestone values of 0 for 2015, 1 for 2016, 2 for 2017, and so on up to 10 for 2025. With respect to the weights, the seven themes of the Declaration goals have equal weight in the AATS overall score.² Performance categories within the same theme have the same weight, and indicators within the same performance category have the same weight. As a result, the indicators have different weights in the AATS overall score, as the number of indicators differs across performance categories and the number of performance categories differs across themes. Individual indicators under a performance category with many indicators, as well as those under a theme with several performance categories, have lower weight compared to those under a theme with few indicators or performance categories (see Benin et al. [2018] for further discussion on the weights).

It is the combination of these characteristics that yields a nonlinear trajectory of the AATS overall benchmarks, which increase at a decreasing rate (Figure 1). Considering the years when the data are measured for a BR, the benchmarks are 3.94 in 2016 for the inaugural 2018 BR, 6.66 in 2018 for the 2020 BR, 7.66 in 2020 for the 2022 BR, 8.65 and 9.57 for the next successive BRs, and then 10 in 2025 for the last BR. Using different targets, weights, and other assumptions would result in different trajectories, as shown in Figure 1. The first assumes that all the indicators have the same weight in the AATS. The second adds the assumption that the target for the indicators, except for those on public and private investment, is 2025 and the milestones increase at a uniform rate; the third is like the second but the milestones increase at an increasing rate. The benchmarks for these three scenarios are lower than those for the AATS until they all converge at 10 in 2025.

Figure 1: Benchmarks for the CAADP BR and AATS under alternative assumptions



Source: Author's illustration based on the BR technical guidelines and reports (AUC 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020).

Notes: BR = biennial review. AATS = Africa Agricultural Transformation Scorecard. For the horizontal axis, the years at the bottom are the years that the BR reports are released or expected to be released, whereas those on top are the corresponding latest years of the data, starting from the baseline year of 2015, when the indicators are measured.

The different scenarios for the benchmark trajectory show that countries must raise their performance each year, although at different rates under each scenario. The question then is whether to put more effort up front, as required in the current BR, or to spread it out evenly or concentrate it toward the end, as in the alternative scenarios. That the current BR puts more effort up front is consistent with the logical framework of first putting the relevant policies (theme 1), investments (theme 2), and accountability mechanisms (theme 7) in place that will help to drive the sector's transformation and broader outcomes, other factors remaining unchanged. Regardless of the trajectory of the benchmarks chosen, if a country fails to reach the benchmark in one year, then it will have a double hurdle to overcome in the next BR: first to make up the shortfall from before, and


² The seven thematic areas are: re-committing to CAADP process (theme 1), enhancing agricultural investment (theme 2), ending hunger (theme 3), halving poverty through agriculture (theme 4), boosting intra-African agricultural trade (theme 5), enhancing resilience to climate variability (theme 6), and enhancing mutual accountability (theme 7).

then to achieve what is required at the time. This means that the more a country falls behind in any BR, the more difficult it will be for the country to get on-track in subsequent BRs. This is consistent with the logical framework that without the necessary policies, investments, and accountability mechanisms in place early, the sector's transformation and broader outcomes will be delayed or not materialize in the timeframe of the Declaration, other factors remaining unchanged. On the other hand, the more a country gets ahead in one year, the less will be required for it to remain on-track for the subsequent BR.

The combination of the different target years and weights for the different indicators in the AATS overall also implies that different incremental effort is required to get and stay on-track for achieving the different indicators in successive BRs. For example, the indicators with the target year of 2018 (e.g., 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.4, 3.1iv, 3.1vi, and 7.2) are expected to have been achieved by 2020 BR, when their expected contribution to the overall score is also at its peak. Figure 2 illustrates this idea by decomposing the contribution of different

indicators to the change in the benchmarks between successive BRs. Between the 2018 and 2020 BRs, for example, the indicators in themes 1 (CAADP process), 2 (public and private investment), and 7 (mutual accountability) combined contributed two-thirds (themes 1 = 35%, theme 2 = 17%, and theme 7 = 15%) to the change needed for countries to maintain their status in the 2018 BR relative to the benchmark in the 2020 BR. The contribution of the indicators in themes 1 and 2 goes to zero, whereas that of those in theme 7 drops. The contribution of indicators in the other themes increases—although the contribution of indicators in themes 3 and 5 increases throughout and that of those in themes 4 and 6 increases and then decreases. In other words, any improvements that a country makes on the indicators in themes 1 and 7 in the future BRs will only serve to make up for deficits in the past BRs (2018 and 2020).

Figure 2: Contribution of indicators to change in the BR and AATS benchmarks by theme (%)



Source: Author's illustration based on the BR technical guidelines and reports (AUC 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020).

Notes: BR = biennial review. AATS = Africa Agricultural Transformation Scorecard. For the horizontal axis, the years at the bottom are the years that the BR reports are released or expected to be released, whereas those on top are the corresponding latest years of the data when the indicators are measured.

PERFORMANCE OF COUNTRIES IN THE 2018 AND 2020 BRs

Figures 3a and 3b show the overall score for countries in the 2018 and 2020 BRs, decomposed by the contribution of the different indicators.³ In the 2018 BR, for all the countries taken together, the bulk of the overall score derives from the indicators in themes 1 (24%), 7 (22%), 2 (14%), and 6 (14%), whereas the indicators in the other themes contributed 10% or less (theme 3 = 8%, theme 4 = 10%, theme 5 = 9%; see Figure 3a and Table 1 for details). This is consistent with the earlier discussion on the effort needed to maintain one's status in successive BRs. There is a fundamental difference between the countries on-track compared to those not-on-track, however. The countries on-track performed much higher in themes 3, 4, 5, and 6 (ending hunger, halving poverty, boosting intra-African trade, and enhancing resilience, respectively), with the contribution to the score from these themes being higher by 17–32% (or 2–3 percentage points [ppts])—see Table 1. The countries that were not-on-track seem to have put more effort into themes 1, 2, and 7 (CAADP process, investment, and mutual accountability, respectively) than did those that were on-track.

³ The contribution of indicator i to the overall score is given by $w_{ipt} * I_{S_i}$, where w_{ipt} is the weight of indicator i in performance category p and theme t , and I_{S_i} is the score for indicator i . Then, $w_{ipt} = (I_p)^{-1} (P_t)^{-1} (7)^{-1}$, where I_p is the number of indicators in performance category p , P_t is the number of performance categories in theme t , and 7 is the number of themes in the BR. Summing $w_{ipt} * I_{S_i}$ across the indicators in a theme gives the total contribution of the indicators in that theme.

Figure 3a: 2018 BR score and contribution of indicators by theme





Figure 3b: 2020 BR score and contribution of indicators by theme



Sources for 3a and 3b: Author's illustration based on the BR reports (AUC 2018, 2020).

Notes: Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Somalia and South Sudan did not report in the 2018 BR. Egypt and Sao Tome and Principe did not report in the 2020 BR. Algeria, Comoros, Libya and Sahrawi did not report in both BRs.

In the 2020 BR (Figure 3b), only three countries (Rwanda, Mali, and Morocco) out of the 20 that were on-track in the 2018 BR remained on-track in the 2020 BR. Is this because the benchmark was too high? At 6.66, the benchmark in the 2020 BR is nearly 70% higher than the benchmark in the 2018 BR at 3.94. But, one country, Ghana, went from being not-on-track in the 2018 BR to being on-track in the 2020 BR.

Looking at the contribution of the different indicators to the 2020 BR score (Table 1), the performance in the indicators under themes 1, 2, 6, and 7 continued to dominate for all the countries taken together: 28% for theme 1, 22% for theme 7, 16% for theme 6, and 12% for theme 2. Again, the indicators in the other themes contributed 10% or less (theme 3 = 7%, theme 4 = 5%, theme 5 = 10%). Comparing the performance in 2020 of those that were on-track and those not-on-track in the 2018 BR, however, the results are mixed. Together, the countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR did not perform much better than those that were not-on-track in themes 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the 2020 BR; they had performed better on these in the 2018 BR.

Table 1: 2018 and 2020 BR score and contribution of indicators by theme (average for all countries)

	Score	Theme (% of score)						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2018 BR								
All countries	3.59	24.5	14.4	6.8	9.8	8.7	13.8	22.1
On-track in 2018	4.70	19.9	13.0	8.0	10.9	10.7	15.7	21.8
Not-on-track in 2018	2.78	27.8	15.4	5.9	9.0	7.2	12.4	22.3
Difference (%pts)	1.92	-7.9	-2.4	2.1	1.9	3.5	3.3	-0.5
Difference (%)	69.09	-39.6	-18.1	26.4	17.5	32.4	21.2	-2.5
2020 BR								
All countries	4.52	27.9	12.0	7.4	5.5	9.9	15.7	21.6
On-track in 2018	5.11	23.3	13.6	8.4	6.6	8.7	18.1	21.2
Not-on-track in 2018	4.11	31.0	10.9	6.7	4.7	10.7	14.0	22.0
Difference (%pts)	1.00	-7.7	2.7	1.7	1.9	-2.0	4.1	-0.8
Difference (%)	24.25	-32.8	19.9	20.1	28.7	-22.3	22.8	-3.8
Change between BRs (2020-2018)								
All countries	1.05	9.5	12.0	11.6	23.7	15.8	18.7	8.6
On-track in 2018	0.44	-2.4	12.9	13.5	53.5	7.8	22.5	-7.7
Not-on-track in 2018	1.43	16.8	11.5	10.5	5.5	20.6	16.4	18.7
Difference (%pts)	-0.99	-19.2	1.3	3.0	48.0	-12.8	6.1	-26.4
Difference (%)	-69.29	791.5	10.3	22.0	89.7	-164.0	27.1	341.8

Source: Author's illustration based on the BR reports (AUC 2018, 2020).

Notes: Difference is value for on-track minus value for not-on-track.


These nuances are better illustrated by looking at the change between the scores in the 2018 and 2020 BRs, as well as their decomposition by the contribution of the different indicators to the change (Figure 4). For the countries that reported in the 2018 BR, only three of them (Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia) managed to increase their score by the margin required (2.73) to maintain their status relative to the benchmark in the 2020 BR at the same level as in the 2018 BR.⁴ Because Ghana was on the borderline of being on-track in the 2018 BR, this substantial increase managed to get it to an on-track status in the 2020 BR.

On average, the countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR, except for a few whose overall score declined, increased their score in the 2020 BR much more than the countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR. However, because of the large deficit in the 2018 BR for the countries that were not on track (i.e., comparing their score relative to the benchmark—see Figure 3a), the bulk of the increase for these countries in the 2020 BR went toward making up the deficit, and thus they remained below the benchmark to get on-track. What is encouraging for the countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR is that their greater improvement in the 2020 BR reduced the gap between the average scores of the two groups; from 69% in the 2018 BR (4.70 for those that were on-track and 2.78 for those that were not-on-track) to 24% in the 2020 BR (5.11 for those that were on-track and 4.11 for those that were not-on-track). Essentially, the average score for countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR increased by only 0.44 whereas the average score for those that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR increased by 1.43 (Table 1). Furthermore, the bottom 10 countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR all moved up in rank in the 2020 BR.

Tunisia, for example, climbed up from the 43rd to the 5th position. Sierra Leone, which was third from the bottom, moved up to the 11th position, and Liberia, which was at the bottom, moved up by seven spots. This shift may due to the greater increase in data reporting for those that were not-on-track (increased on average by 9% from 67% to 73% in the 2018 and 2020 BRs, respectively) compared to those that were on-track (increased on average by only 2% from 84% to 86% in the 2018 and 2020 BRs, respectively).

⁴ Note that Eritrea and South Sudan did not report in the 2018 BR. Thus, they are excluded from the discussion although Figure 4 shows that they surpassed the change needed to maintain their status in the 2020 BR.

Figure 4: Change in the 2018 and 2020 BR scores and contribution of indicators by theme



Sources: Author's illustration based on the BR reports (AUC 2018, 2020).

Notes: Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Somalia and South Sudan did not report in the 2018 BR. Egypt and Sao Tome and Principe did not report in the 2020 BR. Algeria, Comoros, Libya and Sahrawi did not report in both BRs.

It seems that the countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR may have been complacent in the following years, with consequences for the 2020 BR. This is reflected in Figure 4b, which shows that virtually all 17 countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR (except for Rwanda) experienced a decline in the average score of the indicators in at least one theme. Furthermore, the declines in the average indicator score by theme for this group of countries was larger than the declines experienced for the countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR. Overall, only eight countries (Angola, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia) did not experience any decline in the average indicator score by theme.

Delving into the differences between the two groups further, Figure 4 and Table 1 show that the countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR regressed in the average indicator score on the CAADP process (theme 1) and mutual accountability (theme 7), which is surprising as these are fundamental to achieving the Malabo Declaration. This, however, may be due to the revision of the data to follow a logical response pattern, which was absent in the 2018 BR, allowing for errors in the computation of indicators (see Benin et al. [2018] for details). The change in the average indicator score was also lower for intra-African agricultural trade (theme 5) compared to the countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR. But these countries substantially outperformed those that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR in the change in the average indicator score on ending hunger (theme 3), which seems to have been the main challenge for the countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR.

To understand the dynamics further, Figures 5a to 5c show results for three selected countries: Ghana, the only country to go from not-on-track status in the 2018 BR to on-track status in the 2020 BR; Tunisia, the country with the largest increase in the overall score, and which climbed up from 43rd position in the 2018 BR to 5th in the 2020 BR; and Botswana, one of the top countries that went from being on-track in the 2018 BR to not-on-track in the 2020 BR. Across the three countries, the indicators under theme 3 contributed little to the change in progress between the two BRs, which is consistent with the earlier findings for all countries. Ghana and Tunisia made good progress in most of the indicators under themes 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, but did poorly in the indicators under theme 2. The most surprising case is Botswana, which basically regressed in the advances it had made in the 2018 BR in most of the indicators under themes 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7. It is likely that Botswana may have overestimated its progress in those indicators in the 2018 BR, as some of the analysis in Benin et al. (2018) shows.

The indicators showing the least progress across the three selected countries, in terms of meeting their milestones, are indicator 2.4 (on farmers' access to financial services), indicator 3.4 (on social protection for vulnerable groups), indicator 5.1 (on intra-African agricultural trade), and indicator 6.2 (on government spending on resilience building). For all the 49 reporting countries in the 2020 BR, the top 10 most challenging indicators, in terms of the number of countries that are missing some data parameters, are on the main

outcomes under themes 3 (ending hunger) and 4 (halving poverty)—see Table 2 for details. With at least half of all the countries experiencing some data gaps in several indicators, meaning these indicators are not being measured, it is difficult to see how achievement of the goals and targets of the Malabo Declaration overall can be evaluated.

Figure 5a: Change in the 2018 and 2020 BR score and contribution of indicators, Ghana




Figure 5b: Change in the 2018 and 2020 BR score and contribution of indicators, Tunisia





Figure 5c: Change in the 2018 and 2020 BR score and contribution of indicators, Botswana



Sources for 5a, 5b and 5c: Author's illustration based on the BR reports (AUC 2018, 2020).

Notes: Indicators 2.2, 2.3, and 4.1ii are yet to be measured in the BR. Egypt and Sao Tome and Principe did not report in the 2020 BR. Algeria, Comoros, Libya and Sahrawi did not report in both BRs.

Table 2: Top ten indicators with missing data parameters

Indicator number and name			Number of data parameters required	Number of countries with missing data parameters ¹		
				Total	All	Some
1	3.6iii	Trade aspect of food safety (food safety trade index)	5	42	29	13
2	5.1	Growth rate of the value of trade of agricultural commodities and services within Africa	8	42	6	36
3	3.6ii	Health aspect of food safety (food safety health index)	10	41	12	29
4	4.1v	Reduction rate of the gap between the wholesale price and farmgate price	4	34	29	5
5	3.5v	Growth rate of the proportion of Minimum Dietary Diversity-Women	2	33	27	6
6	4.3	Percentage of youth that is engaged in new job opportunities in agriculture value chains	4	32	13	19
7	4.4	Proportion of rural women that are empowered in agriculture	5	32	22	10
8	4.2	Number of priority agricultural commodity value chains for which a PPP is established with strong linkage to smallholder agriculture	4	29	22	7
9	3.5vi	Proportion of 6-23 months old children who meet the Minimum Acceptable Diet	2	27	15	12
10	3.5vii	Reduction in the prevalence of adult individuals (15 years or older) found to be food insecure	2	27	18	9

Source: Author's illustration based on the 2020 BR report (AUC 2020).

Notes: PPP = public-private partnership. ¹ All = countries where all of the required data parameters are missing; Some = countries where some, but not all, of the required data parameters are missing.

CONCLUSIONS, OUTLOOK FOR THE 2022 BR, AND IMPLICATIONS

Analysis of the trajectory of the CAADP BR and AATS benchmarks and decomposition of the contribution of different indicators to the change in the overall score between the 2018 and 2020 BRs have helped explain why only four countries (Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and Rwanda) were on-track in the 2020 BR compared to 17 in the inaugural 2018 BR. Though the benchmark for being on-track or not-on-track was higher in the 2020 BR (6.66) compared to the 2018 BR (3.94), the increase in the benchmark over time reflects the expectation that countries would increase their performance in the indicators gradually from zero in the baseline year of 2015 to 10 in the end year of 2025. It seems that the countries that were on-track in the 2018 BR may have been complacent going into the 2020 BR or they did not internalize the effort needed to remain or get on-track. On average, the countries that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR improved their score in the 2020 BR much more than those that were on-track, which allowed them to close the gap in the average score between the two groups substantially. This may be a result of the greater increase in the data reporting rate among those that were not-on-track compared to those that were on-track.

Looking toward the 2022 BR, based on the contribution of indicators to the change in the scores between the first two BRs, the countries that were on-track in 2018 BR need to reverse their regression in the indicators on the CAADP process (theme 1) and mutual accountability (theme 7). For those that were not-on-track in the 2018 BR, their main challenge is with the indicators on ending hunger (theme 3), which they must substantially improve while maintaining the rate of improvement in the other indicators to get them on-track.

Because of the COVID-19 global pandemic, however, getting on-track in the 2022 BR will be very challenging for all countries. This is because 2020 will be the latest year that the data are measured for the 2022 BR (Figure 1). With the economic downturn and global crisis that is already being experienced or associated with COVID-19 and predicted to be worse for Africa (see e.g., Vos et al. 2020), many of the indicators measured in 2020 will likely be declining, which may deepen the score deficits in the 2022 BR and could persist into the

2024 BR. To avoid a global food security crisis, governments should resist panicking and keep trade channels open so that regional and international markets can work to prevent food shortages and price hikes, such as those that occurred during the food price crisis of 2007-2008 and the Ebola epidemic that hit Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in 2014.

Meanwhile, given the possibility that COVID-19 will cause an outlier situation for the 2022 BR, it makes sense to consider revising the BR and AATS methodology to make it more robust to years with abnormally high or low data values that do not reflect any underlying policy changes or actions. There are at least two ways to do this. The first is to use the preceding year and benchmark. In this case, the latest data year will be 2019 and the benchmark will be 7.16 instead of 7.66 when the data year is 2020. The downside of this is that it only adds one year of data, which may not be enough time to see the effect of any policy actions or investments made to improve outcomes. The second way to make the BR and AATS methodology more robust is to use all the data points from 2015 to the latest year in estimating the indicators and then calculating the scores. This method is already applied for some indicators (e.g., 2.1i to 2.1iii on public and private investment), where the average value from 2015 to the latest year is used. For many other indicators that are measured as growth rates, only the 2015 and latest year data points are used, making those indicators more prone to the effect of outliers. Using all the data points from 2015 to the latest year in estimating the indicators is good even for years that seem normal at the global level but may be abnormal for some countries or even some indicators in the same country. The effect of these two potential approaches on the BR results can be analyzed by redoing the calculations for the 2020 BR and examining how the results differ from what has already been released. With the first approach, for example, the latest data year to use will be 2017 instead of 2018 and the corresponding benchmark will be 5.33 instead of 6.66.

Doing this can help avoid any disillusionment with the BR process, to the extent that it avoids attributing the negative effects of COVID-19 on the BR results to countries' lack of effort in implementing the Malabo Declaration. Confidence in the BR results can also be built up by increasing the quality of data to improve the statistical significance and reliability of estimated relationships between outcomes and policies, investments, and behavior of actors in the agrifood system, while accounting for other factors and external shocks. Then, the effect of COVID-19 on the BR process and results can be reliably isolated and analyzed, so that the efforts and progress of countries in implementing the Malabo Declaration may be confidently assessed in the presence of COVID-19. Similarly, the data gaps in many countries on several of the indicators need to be filled so that achievement of the goals and targets of the Malabo Declaration overall can be comprehensively evaluated and lessons learned.

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